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1  Overview of this thesis 
 
 
1.1  The purpose of this thesis  
 
 
My purpose with this thesis is, as its title suggests, to evaluate the future of arbitration 
as a means of dispute resolution in light of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements (henceforth “Hague Convention”). The main focus of this thesis will 
therefore be on the similarities and differences between the New York Convention and 
Hague Convention, and if there are discrepancies that might make the option of 
arbitration under the former or litigation under the latter, a better option for business 
parties as a way of solving disputes that might arise between them in the future.  
 
This will necessitate answering several questions. To what extent are the methods for 
recognition and enforcement in arbitration under the New York Convention similar to the 
regime for enforcement and recognition under the Hague Convention? How do the relevant 
systems approach the issue of validity of arbitration agreements/ choice of court 
agreements? What are the exceptions from the recognition and enforcement of awards and 
judgments under the relevant systems? More generally, what are considered to be the 
strengths and weaknesses of arbitration and litigation? Furthermore, what opinions do 
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business practitioners have on the efficacy of arbitration? These are just some of the issues 
that I will touch on in the course of this thesis. 
 
 
1.2    The scope of this thesis 
 
It is not easy (nor do I consider it necessary) to draw a clear line of distinction between 
what falls within the scope of this thesis and what does not. As I mentioned above, a 
number of issues must be considered in order for me to give an opinion on the future of 
arbitration.  
  
 
1.3   Sources of law 
 
 
Naturally, I will make use of the New York Convention and the Hague Convention as 
sources of law in this thesis. In the process of evaluating the Hague Convention, I will 
also consider the 2007 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (henceforth the “Lugano Convention”) and Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (henceforth “Council 
Regulation 44/2001”).  The reason I am doing this is because these systems regulate 
many similar matters that the Hague Convention does, and thus may be helpful in 
establishing the overall efficacy (or lack thereof) of the Hague Convention. The 
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UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law (including the 2006 
revision) will also be used for reference.  
 
I will be making extensive use of the works of various authors on subjects like 
international commercial law and international arbitration, as well as specific 
commentaries regarding the different convention systems. 
 
Additionally, I will be making some use of the national laws and national arbitration 
laws of several countries, as well as case law regarding the interpretation of the New 
York Convention. 
 
 
1.4 Terminology 
 
 
The term “recognition and enforcement” will be used with some frequency in this 
thesis. It is therefore necessary to clarify the meaning of the term as a whole, as well as 
the meaning of “enforcement” and “recognition” as separate parts.   
  
Recognition entails the acceptance of a foreign award or judgment as having the same 
effect as a domestic award or judgment. Based on this recognition, the winning party 
can then seek to have the award or judgment given force against the losing party in the 
recognizing country (enforcement). In other words, an award or judgment cannot be 
enforced before it is recognized. However, in practice the terms often are used together. 
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Often both decisions are rendered in the same judgment.1 Unless it is stated explicitly2, 
the term “recognition and enforcement” in this thesis should be taken as referring to the 
enforcement aspect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
2 The Hague Convention, a more uniform framework for enforcement and 
recognition of foreign court judgments    
 
2.1   Introduction  
 
 
Arbitration as a means of dispute resolution is today a stalwart element of international 
commercial transactions. Many business parties insert arbitration clauses in their 
agreements, and leading arbitrational institutions like The International Chamber of 
Commerce International Court of Arbitration (“ICC”), American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”) and the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) together have a 
                                                
%!9IJKIJ!L"H%HM!N#!BEE!
"!0O!PQ!RSJ!PTOQUTVI!PO!PT!0JQ#!))!SR!QWI!/IX!5SJY!,STZITQPST!XWPVW![IU\O!XPQW!QWI!
JIVSKTPQPST!SR!UT!UJ]PQJUQPST!UKJII^ITQ!
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yearly caseload of several thousand disputes, many of them involving substantial sums of 
money.3 
 
Historically however, national courts viewed arbitration with skepticism, and sometimes 
showed reticence in enforcing arbitration awards. Towards the second half of the 20th 
century this viewpoint was gradually eroded, and it became accepted by most courts that 
private parties should have the ability to select their own form of dispute resolution, 
including the option to submit their dispute to arbitration.4 
 
It is reasonable to assume that this is owed to a large degree to the unifying effect of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 
(“The New York Convention”). Over 140 countries are party to the New York Convention, 
including all major trading states. The convention provides a framework for the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. It is difficult to view the convention as 
anything but a success, with enforcement under the convention system only being refused 
by domestic courts in approximately 10% of reported cases.5 
 
If the Hague Convention were to come into effect in a comparable number of countries, it 
could potentially have the same effect on the enforcement and recognition of foreign 
judgments that the New York Convention has had for the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.  The Hague Convention provides rules giving effect to choice of 
                                                
$!9SJT!L"H%HM!N#!@EC@;!
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court agreements, and for the recognition and enforcement of the resulting judgments. As 
Brand & Herrup point out:  
 
“Both conventions create rules for honoring party choice of forum and recognizing the 
resulting tribunal decision”.6 
 
 The accession of one more state is still necessary before the Hague Convention comes into 
force.7  As of now, the United States, Mexico and the EU have all signed the convention, 
but only Mexico has acceded.  
 
The 2007 Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001 also provide a comparable 
regime to that of the Hague Convention, but within a narrower geographic scope. However, 
their material scope is broader since they regulate more issues then the Hague Convention, 
in particular issues regarding domicile.8 Parties to the Lugano Convention are all the 
Member States of the European Community, as well as Switzerland, Denmark, Norway and 
Iceland. Council Regulation 44/2001 applies within all Member States of the European 
Union, as well as Denmark.9 Materially the two systems are very similar (as will be seen 
below). As pertains to membership, the Lugano Convention provides for the possibility for 
                                                
B!9JUT[!_!1IJJ`N!L"HH?M!N#!%%!
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;!0\QWS`KW!U!^I^]IJ!SR!QWI!2'b!+IT^UJY!WUO!SNQI[!S`Q!SR!VIJQUPT!UJIUO!SR!c`[PVPU\!
VSSNIJUQPST!XPQWPT!QWI!'TPST!LOII!
WQQNd::XXX#`^#[Y:IT:^IT`:2':-WI+UTPOW.NQS`QO:!Mb!QW`O!TIVIOOPQUQPTK!U!ONIVPRPV!
UKJII^ITQ!XPQW!QWI!2'!IeQIT[PTK!QWI!IRRIVQO!SR!,S`TVP\!(IK`\UQPST!@@:"HH%!QS!
+IT^UJY!
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non-EU or EFTA states to accede to the convention,10 which Council Regulation 44/2001 
does not.11  
 
2.2      The relationship between the Lugano Convention, Council Regulation 
44/2001 and the Hague Convention 
 
The relationship between the systems is regulated under Title VII of the Lugano 
Convention, Chapter VII of Council Regulation 44/2001 and Art. 26 of the Hague 
Convention.  
 
Given their material similarities, the potential for conflict between the two EU systems, is 
not as significant as the potential for conflict between them and the Hague Convention. As 
Pertegás points out, this was considered in the drafting process of the Hague Convention 
and resulted in the inclusion of Art. 26(6),12 which states: 
 
“This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic 
Integration Organisation that is a Party to this Convention, whether adopted before or after 
this Convention 
 
a) where none of the parties is resident in a Contracting State that is not a Member 
State of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation 
                                                
%H!4`KUTS!,STZITQPST!0JQ#!EH!LVM!
%%!>`O`UTQ!QS!0JQ#!"E!L$Mb!QWI!1UK`I!,STZITQPST!U\OS!PO!SNIT!QS!UVVIOOPST!]a!U\\!OQUQIO!
%"!>IJQIKfO!L"H%HM!N#!@!!
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b) as concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments as between Member States 
of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation.” 
 
A Regional Economic Integration Organisation is defined in Article 29 as an entity 
“…constituted solely by sovereign States which has competence over some or all of the 
matters governed by this Convention…”.  
 
The European Union, which as mentioned has signed the Hague Convention, falls within 
this category. According to Pertegás, the effect of Art. 26 (6)(a) of the Hague Convention is 
that: 
 
“…the Brussels I Regulation prevails where both parties are resident in (a) European Union 
member state(s), or where one party is resident in an European Union member state and the 
other in a non-European Union state which is not Party to the Hague Convention. Where 
one party resides in an European Union state and the other in a non-European Union state 
that is a party to the Hague Convention, the latter prevails.”13 
 
The author goes on to say: 
 
“Similarly, the relevant regime for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
depends on the origin of the rendered judgment (Art. 26(6)(b) of the Convention). 
Accordingly, judgments originating in an European Union court will always be subject to 
                                                
%$!>IJQIKfO!L"H%HM!N#!@!
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the recognition and enforcement rules of the Brussels I Regulation when recognition and 
enforcement is sought in another European Union member state.”14  
 
In the following I will consider to what extent the use of arbitration may be challenged by 
the introduction of such instruments. Given that the Hague Convention by its (potentially 
global) nature is the most analogous to the New York Convention, I will focus mainly on 
this instrument in my analysis.  
 
2.3    The convention regimes for jurisdiction, enforcement and recognition-    
similarities and differences 
 
 
2.3.1   Jurisdiction and the validity of an agreement to arbitrate/ choice of court 
clause 
 
Article II (1) of the New York Convention provides that each Contracting party shall 
recognize an agreement to arbitration, while Art. II (3) provides that the courts of a 
contracting state shall, when requested by one of the parties, refer the dispute to arbitration, 
unless the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. In other 
words, assuming the agreement to arbitrate is valid, the courts of a contracting state not 
                                                
%@!>IJQIKfO!L"H%HM!N#!A!
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only have jurisdiction to refer the dispute to arbitration, they are under an obligation to do 
so.15 
 
 This provision is comparable to the provision in Art. 5(1) of the Hague Convention, stating 
that a court chosen by the parties in an exclusive choice of court agreement has jurisdiction 
unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that state. Council Regulation 
44/2001 and the Lugano Convention both regulate this issue in Art. 23, which provide that 
parties may choose a court or courts of a Member State to have jurisdiction over disputes 
that may arise in the relationship between them. Such jurisdiction is exclusive unless the 
parties have agreed otherwise. Unlike the New York Convention and the Hague 
Convention, these systems do not apply an explicit exception for where the agreement on 
jurisdiction is null and void.  They do however have rules specifying formal requirements 
for the validity of an agreement conferring jurisdiction.16 
 
In order to compare and contrast the solutions that the respective systems use to determine 
the validity of an agreement to arbitrate or of a choice of court clause, it is necessary to 
consider several issues: 
 
1) The formal requirements the analyzed systems apply in determining whether an 
agreement is valid 
 
                                                
%A!=PQW!VIJQUPT!IeVINQPSTOb!QWUQ!XP\\!]I![IQUP\I[!]I\SX!!
%B!,S`TVP\!(IK`\UQPST!@@:"HH%!0JQ#!"$L%M!UT[!L"Mb!4`KUTS!,STZITQPST!0JQ#!"$!L%M!UT[!
L"M!
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2) The law applicable to the question of substantive validity (ie, whether the form 
requirements are met). 
 
 
2.3.2  Form requirements for validity of an agreement to arbitrate/choice of court 
clause 
 
All the analyzed systems have regulations in this regard, but as we shall see, some of them 
have rather stringent formal requirements, while others are more permissive.  All the 
systems recognize an agreement in writing17, but differ to varying extents on what 
constitutes writing, and on the possibility to enter into an agreement in other ways 
(implicitly, orally etc). 
 
Art. II (2) of the New York Convention refers back to “an agreement in writing” mentioned 
in Art. II(1) and specifies that this “…shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an 
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or 
telegrams”.  However, Cordero-Moss argues that: 
 
“The wording of the New York Convention needs to be interpreted in light of the 
technological context in which the Convention was drafted. The reference to ‘an exchange 
                                                
%E!1UK`I!,STZITQPST!0JQ#!$LVMLPMb!4`KUTS!,STZITQPST!0JQ#!"$!L%MLUMb!,S`TVP\!(IK`\UQPST!
0JQ#!@@:"HH%!0JQ#!"$!L%MLUMb!/IX!5SJY!,STZITQPST!0JQ#!))!L%M!!
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of letters or telegrams’ must be seen as a reference to the most modern means of 
telecommunication that were known at the time”.18  
 
She goes on to say that the intention of the Convention was to “…recognize arbitration 
agreements that were entered into by absent parties using the means of communication they 
generally employ in the course of their business”.19  
 
The author points out that a number of technological advancements in communication 
(telex, fax, electronic communication) have not been covered by the wording of Art. II(2), 
but this has not prevented courts from interpreting the provision so as to extend the effects 
of the provision to also cover arbitration agreements entered into via these methods.20  To 
further back up this argument, she points out that the wording in Art. 7(2) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration21, supports such a 
dynamic interpretation of Art. II (2) of the New York Convention, given their “…common 
line of development”.22 However, she does go on to point out that this interpretation is not 
uncontroversial, and the need for clarification on the issue resulted in the UN General 
Assembly adopting in 2006 a UNICTRAL recommendation regarding Art. II(2) of the New 
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York Convention, providing that the means of communication listed therein are not to be 
interpreted exhaustively.23   
 
To briefly summarize the above, there appears to be a general acceptance that Art. II(2) of 
the New York Convention is to be construed in such a manner that it covers arbitration 
agreements entered into through also modern forms of communication. However, the 
dynamic interpretation cannot be stretched so far as to also cover agreements entered into 
tacitly or orally. The revised 2006 UNCITRAL Model Law is more flexible in this regard, 
as it does not posit a written agreement as an absolute requirement.24 However, it should be 
mentioned that Art. VII of the New York Convention addresses this issue in a different 
way. As Berg points out, Art. VII: 
 
 ” …provides for the freedom of a party to base its request for enforcement of an arbitral 
award on the domestic law concerning enforcement of foreign arbitral awards or other 
treaties, instead of the New York Convention.”25 
 
The author goes on to highlight the rationale for this provision: it is the very goal of the 
New York Convention to facilitate the enforcement and recognition of foreign arbitral 
awards- if this goal can be achieved more easily through domestic law or international 
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arbitration treaties, there is no reason why parties should not be able to rely on those 
regimes.26  
 
This issue separates the New York Convention from Council Regulation 44/2001 and the 
Lugano Convention, both of which employ a concrete general rule to cover such instances, 
stating in Art. 23(1)(b) that an agreement conferring jurisdiction may be “in a form which 
accords with the practices which the parties have established between themselves”. Thus, if 
the parties have always used (for instance) oral agreements as a part of their business 
practice, an oral agreement conferring jurisdiction will be just as valid as a written 
agreement doing the same.  
 
They also contemplate that a valid agreement conferring jurisdiction can be established in 
international trade: 
 
“..in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have been 
aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly observed by, 
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce concerned.”27 
 
Finally, both systems provide for an explicit regulation on the technological development 
of electronic communication, by stating: 
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‘any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement 
shall be equivalent to "writing".’28 
 
 Art. 23 (2) of the Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001 do not provide any 
different effect for the issue of meeting the writing requirement itself, than that which has 
been applied by national courts (via dynamic interpretation) to the requirement for a written 
agreement in Art. II(2) of the New York Convention. However, Articles 23 (1)(b) and (c) 
in both systems serve the purpose of making these systems more liberal in the ways in 
which an agreement can come into existence.  
 
The Hague Convention regulates the question of formal requirements in Art. 3(c)(i) and 
(ii), which state that an exclusive choice of court agreement must be concluded or 
documented in writing, or “by any other means of communication which renders 
information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference”. Brand & Herrup make 
three points29 with regard to this provision. 
 
1) National law cannot add any further form requirements to those listed in Art. (3)(c)(i) 
and (ii). 
 
2) Art. 3(c) presents a low threshold for bringing an exclusive choice of court agreement 
within the boundaries of the Convention. 
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3) Art. 3 (c) is typical of the Convention, in that it seeks to extend the scope of the 
Convention as broadly as possible. 
 
The authors conclude that the effect of this choice is to: 
 
 “…create a large field of judgments eligible for recognition and enforcement under 
Convention rules. A high threshold requirement in terms of form would have been likely to 
reduce disputes on a number of issues (e.g., was there even a meeting of the minds). The 
price of a low threshold-and resulting wide scope of application-is likely to be a somewhat 
larger incidence of litigation on issues such as consent”. 30 
 
Based on this we can see that the New York Convention takes an overall more conservative 
approach regarding form requirements, than the other analyzed systems. While it has been 
interpreted in a manner allowing it to adapt to evolving methods of communication for 
concluding agreements, it does not contain comparable provisions to those in the Lugano 
Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001 that allow for an agreement to be concluded 
on other bases; established practices between the parties or practices common to a 
particular branch of business.31 These two conventions are arguably the most liberal with 
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regards to form requirements, with the Hague Convention somewhere in between them and 
the New York Convention (on paper).  Art. 3 (c) (ii) of the Hague Convention is clearly 
analogous to Articles 23 (2) in Lugano and Council Regulation 44/2001, but the Hague 
Convention does not have any equivalent provision to Art. 23 (1) (b) and (c) of these 
systems.  
 
The consequences of the above observations could be that, as Brand & Herrup accentuated 
above, an elevated level of judicial challenges directed towards choice of court agreements 
based on the issue of whether form requirements are met. One could argue that this is less 
likely to be an issue under the New York Convention, given its somewhat stricter form 
requirements. However, as pointed out above, the wording of Art. II of the New York 
Convention does not actually reflect the way in which the provision is applied. The 
dynamic interpretation of form requirements has made the system more flexible, but at the 
same time has created uncertainty regarding its application. While the relatively low 
threshold for form requirements under the Hague Convention might attract a not 
insignificant number of judicial challenges, they seem to comport better with a modern 
view on formal requirements for arbitration agreements. Furthermore, one might assume 
that because Art. 3 (c) (i) and (ii) of the Hague Convention reflect a more “updated” and 
consensus-driven development in this regard, that the provision will be applied with a 
greater degree of uniformity than has Art. II of the New York Convention. 
 
 18 
This, I would argue, is a factor suggesting that it will be somewhat more likely for an 
arbitration agreement based on the New York Convention to be set aside, than a choice of 
court agreement under the Hague Convention. 
 
 However, to fully asses this issue of it will also be necessary to look at how the systems 
determine the law applicable to the null and void exception and other limitations at the 
jurisdictional stage. 
 
2.3.3      Determining the law applicable to the issue of substantive validity 
 
As pertains to the law applicable to determining whether a choice of court agreement is 
“null and void”, the Hague Convention considers this in light of the whole law of the state 
of the court chosen, including that state’s choice of law rules.32 As pointed out by Richard 
Brand, this may allow the  ”…parties to the choice of court agreement to select the law of a 
state whose rules liberally uphold the choice of court agreements.”33  
 
The choice of law rule in Art. 5(1) is the concrete result of the goal of creating a uniform 
approach in the application of the “null and void” criteria. Since the term also appears in 
Art. 6 (a) and 9(a), it would create a great deal of uncertainty with regards to its content, if 
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(for instance) a court not chosen under Art. 6(a) would lend a different meaning to the 
term, than a court chosen under Art. 5(1).34  
 
Brand & Herrup raise the question of whether an autonomous choice of law rule actually 
will yield the desired uniformity, among several concerns referencing the potential problem 
that this requires courts other than the chosen court to apply foreign law, a task they may 
struggle with.35  
 
Art. II (3) of the New York Convention does not by contrast have a regulation of the law 
determining the validity of the arbitration agreement at the jurisdictional stage. However, 
Art. V (1)(a) provides that recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if: 
 
“The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to 
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the 
parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country 
where the award was made” 
 
Since both provisions reference the same arbitration agreement, it would therefore seem to 
follow that the same criteria should be used in determining the validity of the agreement 
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whether the question pertains to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal under Art. II(3) or 
the enforceability of the award under Art. V(1)(a). 36  
 
It would obviously create a great deal of uncertainty if an arbitration agreement could be 
found valid at the jurisdictional stage, only to be found invalid at the stage of enforcement. 
Such an interpretation would lead to a winning party being unable to have his award 
enforced. 
 
 In practice, national courts have tended to read the provisions in the context of each other. 
Berg states: 
 
‘Except for the Italian Supreme Court, no court has doubted that the words “the agreement 
referred to in article II” in ground a of Art. V(1) imply that the lack of written form of the 
arbitration agreement as required by Art. II(2) constitutes a ground for refusal of 
enforcement of an arbitral award…Yet, in a number of subsequent decisions the Italian 
Supreme Court did apply Art. II(2) in proceedings concerning the enforcement of arbitral 
awards…’.37 
 
It thus appears as if national courts in countries party to the New York Convention for the 
most part, if not always, apply the same criteria in determining the validity of an arbitration 
agreement under both articles. As a consequence of this the validity of an arbitration 
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agreement, should, vis-à-vis Art. II(3), be considered in the light of the law chosen by the 
parties to govern the arbitration agreement, and failing such a choice- the law of the arbitral 
seat.38  
 
Cordero-Moss states that parties usually do not specify a law to govern their arbitration 
agreement, meaning recourse to the law of country where the award was made (lex 
arbitri).39 This “fall-back” principle is also recognized in the UNCITRAL Model Law.40   
 
2.3.4   Conclusions on the law applicable to the issue of substantive validity under 
the relevant systems 
 
On the whole, the Hague Convention is this respect provides a clearer and more predictable 
solution than under the New York Convention, where the question of substantive validity is 
not explicitly regulated and case law presents a somewhat fragmented picture. This creates 
a not insubstantial degree of uncertainty for parties relying on arbitration, and can present 
them with unwelcome surprises.   The enhanced predictability provided by Art. 5(1) with 
regards to choice of law should be beneficial to commercial parties, and may be a factor 
pushing them in the direction of pursuing litigation over arbitration.  Nonetheless, the 
importance of this discrepancy should not be overstated, especially given that it is too early 
to know how Art. 5(1) will actually be interpreted and applied in practice. 
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2.3.5       Other limitations at the jurisdictional stage 
 
It should also be pointed out that the Hague Convention provides more limits at the 
jurisdictional stage than the New York Convention does.  Art. 6 of the Hague Convention 
provides that if an exclusive choice of court agreement exists, a court not selected by the 
parties does not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The exceptions to this are if the 
agreement is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court41, lack of 
capacity42, manifest injustice43, the agreement cannot be reasonably performed44, or that the 
chosen court has decided not to hear the case.45  In any of these cases the court not chosen 
may, in spite of its lack of jurisdiction, set the agreement aside.  
 
Art. II(3) of the New York Convention provides similar, but fewer exceptions. As we’ve 
seen, the arbitration agreement being null and void is grounds for not referring the parties 
to arbitration, similar to Art.6 (a) of the Hague Convention.  
 
Incapacity is also ground for the invalidity of an arbitration agreement under Art. V(1)(a) 
of the New York Convention. Even though this provision deals with the enforcement of 
awards, incapacity will also be grounds for invalidity at the jurisdictional stage. This 
follows not only from reading Articles II(3) and V(1)(a) in context, but also from the 
universally recognized legal principle that parties need capacity to enter into agreements.  
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 Neither the Lugano Convention or Council Regulation 44/2001 explicitly mention 
incapacity as grounds for invalidity of a choice of court agreement, but it must be assumed 
that they recognize the same principle. 
 
Also listed in Art. II(3) is the situation that the agreement is “incapable of being 
performed”. The wording suggests a somewhat stricter standard than Art. 6(d) in the Hague 
Convention, where it is sufficient that the agreement cannot be “reasonably performed” due 
to “exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the parties”.  However, according to 
Brand & Herrup46, the provision is analogous to the doctrine of frustration, and covers 
circumstances such as: 
 
1) Legal impossibility (the chosen court no longer exists) 
 
2) Functional impossibility (the chosen court exists but due to a major calamity like 
war or natural disaster, accessing the court is not feasible) and  
 
3) Fundamental transformation (a court by the name of the chosen court exists and 
access to it is possible, but it has become completely different from the court the 
parties selected from outset).  
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It thus appears that both systems are operating with a similar approach regarding 
incapability of performance (that is to say, a very strict one). 
 
The final limitation in Art. II(3) is when the agreement is deemed inoperative. According to 
Berg, the term can be “…said to cover those cases where the arbitration agreement has 
ceased to have effect, such as revocation of the parties”.47 The outcome in this case would 
be the same as under Art. 6(e) of the Hague Convention, although this provision has a 
broader reach. Brand & Herrup state that this exception applies: 
 
“..whenever, for any reason, the chosen court has decided not to hear the case. It would 
include sutuations where the agreement was found to be “null and void” by the chosen 
court under Article 5(1), bars to adjudication due to limitations on subject matter and 
minimum amount in controversy, and such possibilities in the United States as a transfer 
under 28 U.S.C § 1404(a)”.48 
 
In addition to the exceptions that are similar to the ones found in Articles II(3) and V(1)(a) 
of the New York Convention, the Hague Convention presents a further exception particular 
to that system under Art. 6(c). According to this provision, a court not chosen can set the 
arbitration agreement aside where “giving effect to the agreement would lead to manifest 
injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the State of the court 
seised”. 
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According to Brand & Herrup, this exception will apply only in unusual circumstances and 
must be used with “…the greatest circumspection”.49   
 
“Manifest injustice” and “manifestly contrary to the public policy” are two separate 
concepts, although there may be overlap in certain circumstances. Since public policy 
arguments are covered below (in the discussion of Art. V(2)(a) of the New York 
Convention and Art. 9 (e) of the Hague Convention), I will focus on only the former 
principle here. 
 
Brand & Herrup go on to highlight that the term “manifest injustice” has been used in a 
number of Hague Conventions on private international law, and should be given the same 
meaning as used in Hague practice.50  In practice this entails two aspects. Firstly the 
injustice must be clear, and secondly it must be extremely serious.  
 
Taking this into consideration, it does not seem as if Art. 6(c) of the Hague Convention 
should prove a significant obstacle at the jurisdictional stage in enforcing choice of court 
clauses (although, as we shall see below, there are diverging opinions on the matter). 
 
2.3.6      A pro-arbitration interpretation? 
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Born points out that national courts traditionally have taken to a “pro-arbitration” 
interpretation of the limits set in Art. II (3) of the New York Convention, as a consequence 
of which these courts have generally been reluctant to invoke these defenses that would 
invalidate agreements under the convention. 51 Of course, this does not guarantee that this 
stance will be upheld in the future, particularly in the light of an emerging criticism of 
aspects of arbitration (see part 6). 
 
 
2.3.7     Conclusions on the enforcement of arbitration agreements under the New 
York Convention versus the enforcement of choice of court clauses under 
the Hague Convention 
 
 
Based on what I have covered above, I believe the following conclusion can be drawn: 
 
1) It is slightly more likely that the parties to an arbitration agreement under the New 
York Convention will have their agreement set aside at the jurisdictional stage, than 
the parties to an choice of court agreement under the Hague Convention. This is 
mainly due to the clearer form requirements in Art. 3 (c)(i) and (ii) of the latter 
system. However I think the exceptions provided in Art. 6 of the Hague Convention 
for a court not chosen and the fact that national courts have a general pro-arbitration 
policy when it comes to determining the validity of an arbitration agreement 
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compensates for this to a solid degree, meaning that the overall difference is 
relatively minor. 
 
2) A comparison of the relevant provisions52 in this regard suggests that there is not as 
much discrepancy between the two systems as one might assume. Although the 
Hague Convention does have more exceptions, most of them are analogous (or at 
least comparable) to exceptions found in the New York Convention. Where the 
Hague Convention does have monopoly on a particular provision (as with the issue 
of “manifest injustice”), the exception is normally given a very limited scope of 
application. 
 
3) As pertains to the law governing the question of substantive validity of an 
arbitration agreement/choice of court agreement, it seems as if the explicit 
regulation on the matter found in Art. 5(1) and Art. 6(a) of the Hague Convention 
provides a clearer solution than the New York Convention. However, as already 
pointed out, Brand & Herrup have pointed out the potential issues that might arise 
from a court not chosen under Art. 6 applying the law of another state.  
 
 On the whole, the differences between the systems are not stark and it is highly 
questionable whether the mentioned this discrepancy in itself will make arbitration less 
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attractive than litigation to commercial parties. In any case it remains to be seen how 
extensively or restrictively courts will apply the exceptions under the Hague Convention. 
 
3     Enforcement and recognition of awards and judgments 
 
It can perhaps be said that the real crux of the Hague Convention is the provision that a 
judgment resulting from jurisdiction exercised in accordance with an exclusive choice of 
court agreement is to be recognized and enforced in the courts of other Contracting 
States.53  The Lugano Convention has an analogous provision,54 as does Council 
Regulation 44/2001.55 
 
In doing so, these instruments are seeking to accomplish the cross-border enforcement of 
judgments in the same way that Art. III of the New York Convention has accomplished the 
cross-border enforcement of arbitration awards. The ramifications of this are potentially 
great. Until now, arbitration has been viewed by many commercial parties as the clearly 
favored option when conducting business with parties in other states. The Lugano 
Convention and Council Regulation No 44/2001 have provided for enhanced regimes of 
enforcement for foreign judgments within the EU and EFTA, to the point where some 
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commentators think that issues of enforcement no longer are a factor giving automatic 
preference to arbitration when conducting business within those areas.56 In light of this, it is 
evident that the Hague Convention has the potential to have a lasting impact on the use of 
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution in international commerce. As Ronald Brand 
puts it: 
 
“If choice of court clauses will be as easy to enforce as arbitration agreements, and court 
judgments as easy to have enforced as arbitral awards, then the choice between the two 
types of forum will necessarily hinge on the real differences between the two dispute 
settlement options, and not merely on the fact that one is more easily enforced than the 
other”57 (my underlining). 
 
Having considered the enforcement of arbitration agreements and choice of court clauses 
above, it will now be useful to determine the extent to which the enforcement regimes 
granted for judgments under the relevant conventions are comparable in effect to the 
enforcement regime for awards under the New York Convention.  Having established this, 
I will then go on to look at the actual differences between arbitration and litigation when it 
comes to aspects like efficiency, confidentiality, flexibility and neutrality.  
 
The main regulations for enforcement and recognition of awards and judgments are very 
similar under all the relevant regimes, providing for the enforcement of foreign 
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arbitrational awards / judgments in all Contracting States without any special procedure 
and without review as to the substantive law or facts applied by the original court or 
tribunal.58 
 
However, it is important to note that there are exceptions to these main provisions, 
providing grounds by which enforcement of an award or a judgment rendered pursuant to 
an arbitration agreement or choice of court agreement may be refused. The number of 
exceptions, and the circumstances under which they may be applied, will be crucial for 
how the respective enforcement regimes will apply in practice.  
 
3.1    Refusal of enforcement of awards and judgments 
 
Article 9 of the Hague Convention provides the grounds for refusal of enforcement for that 
particular system. Brand & Herrup point out that it is important to recognize that the 
existence of any of the grounds mentioned in Art. 9 does not in itself mean that the chosen 
court is mandated to refuse enforcement, merely that enforcement in such a case is not 
required.59 It is up to each Contracting State to determine rules for how the exceptions will 
apply within its jurisdiction. The same can be said for the New York Convention. The 
wording in Art. V(1) and (2) of the New York Convention states that recognition and 
enforcement “may” be refused if the grounds listed in either provision are present, granting 
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discretion to Member States in determining the scope of the exceptions. This wording is 
different from the one in Art. II(3), where it is stated that a court in a Contracting State 
“shall” refer the parties to arbitration unless the exceptions in that provision apply. The 
referral under this provision is mandatory,60 which is not the case under Art. V(1) and (2).  
 
Art. V(1) contain grounds for refusal of enforcement that must be raised and proven by the 
respondents, while Art. V(2) lists grounds that a court can use to refuse enforcement on it’s 
own initiative.  
 
Berg points out that there is a “pro-enforcement bias” in the structure of Art. IV-Art. VI of 
the New York Convention, and that courts have usually followed an approach that would 
facilitate enforcement of awards.61  According to him, the consequence of this is that the 
grounds for refusal listed in Art. V (1) will be accepted “…in serious cases only”,62 while 
public policy grounds listed in Art. V (2) will only be accepted in  “extreme cases”.63   
 
3.2      Grounds for refusal of enforcement- general overview 
 
3.2.1      Arbitration agreement/ choice of court agreement is null and void 
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The underlying agreement being null and void under the law of the State of the chosen 
court is grounds for refusal of enforcement under the Hague Convention.64 It should be 
pointed out that this ground for refusal mirrors the exception to jurisdiction in Art. 5(1) and 
6(a) that was analyzed above. 
 
A similar provision is found in the New York Convention, although its phrasing is slightly 
different.65 The Hague Convention considers only validity of the contract in light of the law 
of the chosen court, while the New York Convention considers this in light of the law 
chosen by the parties and failing such a choice, in the light of the law of the country where 
the award was made.  However, as we’ve seen above, parties to an arbitration agreement 
often do not choose a law to govern their arbitration agreement, thus entailing recourse to 
the laws of the arbitral seat under most circumstances.  
 
It would therefore seem that the practical difference is relatively insignificant. In choosing 
the arbitral seat, parties are indirectly choosing the law to govern their arbitration 
agreement.  They have the flexibility to select a law to govern their agreement that is 
unlikely to be struck down as invalid, but rarely make use of this option. On the other hand 
the parties to a choice of court agreement choose the law to govern their agreement when 
selecting the court that is to have jurisdiction over their dispute. Thus, they have the option 
of choosing a court whose laws are unlikely to consider their agreement as null and void.66 
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Both systems provide the parties with means by which they can regulate in a predictable 
manner the question of the validity of their agreement. 
 
The Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001 do not include an explicit “null 
and void” exception but they do have rules about how a choice of forum can be made.67  
 
3.2.2       Lacking capacity to conclude an agreement 
 
Lacking capacity to conclude an agreement (typically because the party did not have the 
authority to do so) is grounds for refusal of enforcement under both New York and Hague 
Conventions68, with the former considering the question of capacity in the light of the laws 
applicable to the parties and the latter under the laws of the requested state (meaning the 
laws of the state where enforcement is sought). There is an exception to this general rule if 
the term “null and void” regulates capacity under the applicable law. If this is the case, 
“…recognition and enforcement may be refused if the agreement fails the capacity test 
under either law of the chosen court, or that of the court addressed”.69 
 
The Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001 do not have any explicit 
regulation on this issue, but it is safe to assume that also these systems recognize implicitly 
the same exception.  
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3.2.3        Violation of due process 
 
All the relevant Conventions provide an exception from enforcement where the defendant 
was unable to defend himself and present his case properly due to lack of notification.70  
There are certain differences in terms of language. The Hague Convention refers to the 
document that instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document, and the circumstance 
is that the defendant was not notified of the document in a way that gave him sufficient 
time to arrange for his defense. The New York Convention references two specific issues, 
namely that the party against whom the award was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of arbitrators or of the arbitral proceedings themselves, and lastly (and more 
generally) -that the party was otherwise unable to present his case. 
 
It is difficult to assert whether there is any substantial difference here, as under both these 
systems the key issue is that that the defendant is notified in a way that allows him to 
defend his interests. Berg states that courts generally apply the exception in Art. V(1)(b) 
restrictively, accepting this ground in serious cases only,71 and of course it remains to be 
seen how Art. 9(c) of the Hague Convention will be interpreted in practice by the courts of 
Contracting States.  
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Violations of due process can also be subject to the public policy provision in the New 
York Convention meaning a “…court may also on its own motion refuse enforcement of an 
award for violation of due process on the basis of Article V(2)(b)”.72 
 
The exceptions for lack of due process under Lugano and Council Regulation 44/2001 
closely mirror that of the Hague Convention, including the caveat that defendant may not 
raise issues of notification if they did not challenge the judgment when they had the 
opportunity to do so. 73   
 
3.2.4      Inconsistency or irreconcilability with previous judgment 
 
Most of the systems have exceptions from recognition and enforcement where the 
judgment sought enforced is irreconcilable or inconsistent with another judgment given 
previously in a dispute between the same parties in the enforcing state. 74 The wording of 
the provisions in Hague, Lugano and Council Regulation 44/2001 is essentially identical, 
although Art. 9(g) and (f) of the Hague Convention use the term “inconsistent” as opposed 
to the term “irreconcilable” used in the two other systems. The latter term may suggest a 
stricter regime, demanding utterly conflicting judgments as a prerequisite for refusal of 
enforcement. It would seem that it would be easier for a judgment to meet the criteria of 
inconsistency, although Brand & Herrup emphasize that the Hague Convention does not 
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define “inconsistent” for the purposes of Art. 9(f) and state that  “…it would appear that the 
test for inconsistency will be found in the national law of the requested state”.75 
 
The New York Convention does not regulate this aspect explicitly, but this matter could be 
construed as falling under the public policy grounds in Art. V(2)(b), which, as will be seen 
below, can encompass a significant number of matters (even if they are applied very 
restrictively). 
 
3.2.5      Award/ judgment not yet binding 
 
In a somewhat similar vein, Art. V (1)(e) of the New York Convention provides that 
enforcement of an award may be refused where the award has not yet become binding on 
the parties, or has been set aside by a competent authority in which or under the law of 
which, that award was made. The term “binding” is used to underline the fact that, under 
the system of the New York Convention, it is not required to have a leave for enforcement 
in the country of origin for Art. V(1)(e) to come into effect.76 Berg states that while this 
principle is universally accepted in national courts; 
 
‘The courts, however, differ with respect to the question whether the binding force is to be 
determined under the law applicable to the award or in an autonomous manner independent 
of the applicable law. Indeed, a number of courts investigate the applicable law in order to 
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find out whether the award has become binding under that law. Other courts interpret the 
word “binding”, without reference to an applicable law, as meaning that the award is no 
longer open to a genuine appeal on the merits to a second arbitral instance or to a court.’77    
 
Meanwhile, the Hague Convention does not regulate the matter explicitly, but the matter 
can perhaps fit under the public policy exception in Art. 9(e).  The enforcement of a 
judgment (even as in this case, a foreign judgment) that does not yet have legally binding 
force seems likely to be incompatible with the public policy of most nations.   
 
Both the Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001 contemplate the same 
issue,78 providing that a national court where enforcement of a foreign judgment is sought 
may stay proceedings if an ordinary appeal has been lodged against the judgment in the 
state that delivered the judgment.  
 
3.2.6     Public policy  
 
All the relevant conventions provide that enforcement may be refused if such enforcement 
would be contrary to public policy of the requested state (that is, of the state where the 
enforcement is sought).79  
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As mentioned above, Art. 6(c) uses the phrase “manifestly contrary”, while Art. 9(e) uses 
the term “manifestly incompatible” with public policy. This can raise the question of 
whether there is an intended difference in the standard that is to be applied under the two 
provisions.  Brand & Herrup state that: 
 
“…there is a plausible position that the public policy exception to recognition and 
enforcement is more concrete in its application and thus may be successfully asserted more 
often than will the public policy ground for the exercise of alternative jurisdiction…In the 
case of the exception to recognition and enforcement in Article 9(e), the court addressed 
can compare the definite features of a foreign judgment already rendered to the dictates of 
the public policy of the state in which recognition and enforcement is sought. 
Incompatibility between an actual judgments and dictates of public policy can be known, 
not projected.”80 
 
That is not to say that the public policy exception is intended to have a wide scope of 
application. The authors are quick to point out that “…the intent is to have a high standard 
that will only rarely result in refusal of recognition and enforcement”81. 
 
Art. 9(e) specifies that public policy includes “situations where the specific proceedings 
leading to the judgment were incompatible with the fundamental principles of procedural 
fairness of that State”.  Brand & Herrup clarify that this provision is not “…an invitation to 
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a broad scale attack on the nature, character, or alleged conduct of the foreign judicial or 
legal system as a whole”82, rather it is intended to “…capture an aspect (albeit not an 
identical one) of many legal systems, identified as constitutional due process, or natural 
justice, or right to a fair trial”.83 
 
Art. V(2)(b) of the New York Convention regulates public policy. Berg points out that: 
 
“The distinction between domestic and international public policy means that what is 
considered to pertain to public policy in domestic relations does not necessarily pertain to 
public policy in international relations. According to this distinction, the number of matters 
considered as falling under public policy in international cases is smaller than that in 
domestic ones. The distinction is justified by the differing purposes of domestic and 
international relations.”84 
 
The author goes on to assert that this can be seen as a consequence of giving the grounds 
for refusal of enforcement under Art. V of the New York Convention a very narrow 
application.85  
 
This will be particularly true with the public policy exception. To illustrate this Berg goes 
on to reference a comment by a US Court of Appeal, stating that 
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arbitral awards should be denied enforcement only when the asserted public policy 
“…would violate the forum State’s most basic notions of morality and justice”.86  
 
As Cordero-Moss points out, the definition of public policy may vary from state to state, 
but what does not change is that “…the exception of ordre public has to be applied 
restrictively; in particular, the simple violation of a rule is in itself not sufficient to trigger 
applicability of the public policy clause, not even if the overriding rule is mandatory or 
overriding mandatory”.87  
 
There is thus little to suggest that the public policy exception will apply in a significantly 
different manner under Art. 9(e) than under Art. V 2(b) of the New York Convention.  
Even if the former operates with a slightly milder standard than under Art. 6(c), the 
exception will still only apply in very limited circumstances under both systems.  
 
3.2.7      Exceptions particular to the New York Convention 
 
Art. V(1)(c) of the New York Convention provides that enforcement of an award may be 
refused on the basis of excess of power by the arbitral tribunal. 
 
This exception is a consequence of the fact that “…arbitral tribunal owes its very existence 
to the will of the parties. Consequently, it must follow the parties’ instructions as to its 
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composition88, the procedure it will follow, its jurisdiction, the scope of the dispute that it is 
called upon to solve, the kind of remedies that it may grant”.89   
 
The author goes on to point out that, despite the above observation “…the arbitral tribunal 
enjoys a considerable freedom in respect of the law that it applies to resolve the dispute, 
and that this freedom goes as far as to permit the tribunal to apply the chosen law wrongly, 
or disregard the instructions that the parties gave in respect of what law shall be applied”.90  
This applies so long as the tribunal’s method does not contradict the public policy of the 
court exercising judicial control over the award, and does not award a decision in equity 
without the mandate of the parties. 
 
The Hague Convention does not have an analogous provision (nor do the Lugano 
Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001), as parties litigating do not have the 
possibility of setting the same kind of a framework for the court as parties arbitrating can 
for the tribunal.  
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3.2.8    Arbitrability 
 
Arbitrability is regulated by Art. V(2)(a), and provides grounds for refusal of enforcement 
where “…the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration…”. 
 
Art. V(2)(a) specifies clearly that the determination of whether a matter is arbitrable or not 
is to be determined by the “law of that country”, that is to say-the laws of the state where 
enforcement is being sought. However, another question can be raised- whether 
arbitrability can fall under the invalidity exception in Art. V(1)(a). If one considers that it 
does, the arbitrability issue must be considered not only in light of the law of the 
enforcement court, but also in light of the law governing the arbitration agreement (and as 
we will recall, this will be the law chosen by the parties, or failing such a choice-the law of 
the state where the award was made). Cordero-Moss references Berg, who states that the 
arbitrability issue does not fall within the scope of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement.91 
 
The arbitrability of a matter will therefore be determined by the laws of the state where 
enforcement is sought.  As an example of this, the Norwegian Arbitration Act states in § 9 
that: 
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“Disputes concerning legal relations in respect of which the parties have an unrestricted 
right of disposition may be determined by arbitration. The private law effects of 
competition law may be tried by arbitration”. 
 
A similar regulation is found in Section 1 of the Swedish Arbitration Act, which provides: 
 
“Disputes concerning matters in respect of which the parties may reach a settlement may, 
by agreement, be referred to one or several arbitrators for resolution.” 
 
Yet another example can be found in the Dutch Arbitration Act, Art. 1020. Part 1 of Art. 
1020 provides matters that are arbitrable: 
 
“Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes which have arisen or may arise 
between them out of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.” 
 
Part 3 of Art. 1020 goes on to define matters that are not arbitrable: 
 
“The arbitration agreement shall not serve to determine legal consequences of which the 
parties cannot freely dispose.” 
  
These provisions illustrate an important thing with regards to arbitratbility: matters that are 
within the sphere of private law are typically always arbitrable. However, when the matter 
involves public law or interest, the opposite will often be the case. Cordero-Moss points out 
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that the rationale for the arbitrability rule is to “…preserve the jurisdiction of the courts of 
law in certain areas of law that are deemed to deserve a particularly accurate application of 
the law. This affects particularly areas of law with public policy implications, where the 
public interest is deemed to prevail against the freedom of the parties to regulate their own 
interests”.92 
 
It is here pertinent to point out the relationship between the issue of arbitrability and the 
issue of scope of application. In Art. 2(1) and 2(2), the Hague Convention lists a number 
matters which are outside its scope of application, including but not limited to the status 
and legal capacity of natural persons, contracts of employment, family law matters, wills 
and succession, insolvency and anti-trust matters. Contracting States may also add specific 
matters to this list by declaration, which will then also be excluded from the enforcement 
regime of the convention.93 It is obvious that if many Contracting States were to make use 
of this option to exclude numerous matters, it would significantly damage the effectiveness 
of the Convention. However, Brand points out that Art. 2(3) and Art. 10 address the issue 
of potential misuse, which would assist the Convention in still operating effectively.94 It 
should also be noted that a declaration pursuant to Art. 21 will have reciprocal effect. In 
other words, the matter will not only be excluded from enforcement in the Contracting 
State making the declaration, but also in every other Contracting State where the declaring 
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State is designated in an exclusive court agreement.95 Additionally, Art. 21 implies a fairly 
rigorous test before such a declaration can be made; the State must have a strong interest in 
not applying the Convention to the specific matter (my underlining), the declaration must 
pass the test of proportionality (“..no broader than necessary..”), and the specific subject 
matter excluded must be clearly and precisely defined.  
 
The Lugano Convention and Council Regulation No. 44/2001 have similar provisions, 
although they exclude fewer matters from the scope of their respective conventions.96 They 
also have rules whereby Member State courts have exclusive jurisdiction.97 Neither 
Convention has a provision analogous to Art. 21 of the Hague Convention. 
 
The New York Convention does not, in comparison, have any explicit regulation excluding 
certain matters from its scope like Art. 2 of the Hague Convention. It applies to all 
agreements “in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration”98.  
 
However, the scope of application of the New York Convention as provided by Art. II(1) 
has clear parallels to the definitions of arbitrability in national laws discussed above. In 
particular, the Dutch Arbitration Act uses almost the exact same wording as the New York 
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Convention. The Norwegian Arbitration act is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which as we’ve seen has a common line of development with the New York Convention 
(as well as a many similar regulations). It is therefore not a surprise that the matters deemed 
arbitrable under Norwegian law has a clear similarity to the matters that are arbitrable 
under Art. II(1) the New York Convention.  
 
Thus, many of the matters that are outside the scope of the choice of court conventions, 
will also be matters that are non-arbitrable under the arbitration laws of many nations. For 
instance, the status and legal capacity of natural persons is excluded from the scope of the 
relevant systems in Art. 1(2)(a) of the Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001 
and Art. 2(2)(a) of the Hague Convention.  Such an issue is outside the sphere of private 
law and not one “…in respect of which the parties may reach a settlement” (to use the 
Swedish Arbitration Act as an example). The same will likely apply to all the exceptions 
under the Lugano Convention and Council Regulation (since the exceptions deal with 
matters within the public sphere such as bankruptcy and social security) and most of the 
exceptions under the Hague Convention. As we’ve seen, this may vary from state to state 
dependent on that nations arbitration law.  
 
Brand & Herrup compare Art. 2 of the Hague Convention with Art. II(1) of the New York 
Convention and comment that the fact that the latter does not have a catalogue of 
exclusions from its scope ‘…may mean that matters excluded from the scope of the Hague 
Convention are within the scope of the New York Convention. On the other hand, the 
specific exclusions in the Hague Convention are likely to provide a somewhat greater 
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certainty at the outset than is possible under the New York Convention, which requires 
reference to national law of the appropriate states to determine whether a matter is “capable 
of settlement by arbitration”’99 
 
It should also be noted that the arbitrability exception has led to refusal of enforcement in 
very few cases.100 
 
To briefly summarize the above observations in the form of two main points:  
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Based on the above analysis, there is not a gulf between the New York Convention and the 
choice of court conventions with regards to the scope of the respective systems, when one 
factors in the issue of arbitrability. To take the geology analogy further, the distance is 
perhaps more reminiscent of a narrow crevice. The Lugano Convention and Council 
Regulation 44/2001 provide relatively few exclusions from their scope, and all of them 
pertain to matters that are typically non-arbitrable under the laws of most states. The Hague 
Convention has the most exclusions, but I do not think these are significant enough to 
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detract considerably from its efficiency (although there are those who contend the opposite, 
see below) and make litigation under the Hague Convention to any appreciable extent less 
attractive than arbitration under the New York Convention.  
 
 
3.2.9 Conclusion on exceptions from enforcement under the relevant systems 
 
Having compared the grounds for refusal of enforcement of a judgment in Art. 9 of the 
Hague Convention and Art. 34 of the Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001, 
with the grounds for refusal of enforcement of an award under Art. V(1) and (2) of the New 
York Convention, I believe the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1) There is a substantial amount of overlap in the grounds enumerated in all the 
compared systems.  
 
2) It is of particular interest to note that there is little discrepancy between the   
regulations in the New York Convention and the Hague Convention.  Both systems 
contemplate refusal on grounds such as the agreement being null and void, lacking 
capacity of a party to conclude the agreement, violation of due process and 
violation of public policy (the arbitrability exception will be discussed below in 
conjunction with issues relating to scope of application). While the systems might 
not be exactly analogous, they are similar enough that the choice between litigation 
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and arbitration should not on this basis be compelled to any strong degree in either 
direction. 
 
 
4 The implication of exceptions- diverging opinions 
 
4.1 Born 
 
Born mentions that there is no world-wide foreign judgments convention yet in force, and 
most of his discussion is based on this fact. He emphasizes that while there is, under the 
laws of many states, a presumptive enforceability of foreign money judgments, these are 
subject to a significant number of exceptions, which make it “..difficult to seek the 
enforcement of foreign money or other judgments with any degree of confidence”.101 He is 
however clear that enforcement of such judgments will be far easier where the parties seek 
enforcement in a state covered by the Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 
44/2001.102  Nevertheless, as pertains to the enforcement regime offered by the Hague 
Convention, Born remains skeptical. Although he does state that the coming into force of 
the convention could enhance such enforcement, the exceptions “..may materially detract 
                                                
%H%!9SJT!L"H%HM!N#!%$@!
%H"!)]P[!
 50 
from its practical utility”103 and concludes that “at least for the foreseeable future, 
international arbitration agreements will therefore enjoy a substantial ‘enforceability 
premium’ as compared to the forum selection clauses.”104 
 
4.2 Brand & Herrup 
 
Brand & Herrup state that in deciding between arbitration and litigation, a deciding factor 
might be that  “…matters excluded from the scope of the Hague Convention are within the 
scope of the New York Convention”.105 In other words, the enforcement regime provided 
by the New York Convention comes with fewer caveats than the Hague Convention and 
may thus be preferable.  
 
In doing so Brand & Herrup are echoing some of the sentiments voiced by Born, in that the 
Hague Convention perhaps has too many exclusions from its scope to achieve an effective 
enforcement regime in comparison with the enforcement regime offered by the New York 
Convention. However, they also go on to say: 
 
“On the other hand, the specific exclusions in the Hague Convention are likely to provide 
somewhat greater certainty at the outset than is possible under the New York Convention, 
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which requires reference to national law of the appropriate states to determine whether a 
matter is ‘capable of settlement by arbitration’.”106 
 
They also opine that Council Regulation 44/2001 provides for a superior system of 
enforcement than does the Hague Convention: 
 
“To a large extent, recognition and enforcement are automatic under the Regulation. The 
grounds of refusal, set out in Articles 33 to 37 of the Regulation, are more restricted than 
the grounds of refusal under Article 9 of the Convention.”107 
 
Nevertheless Brand & Herrup are significantly more optimistic than Born that the 
exceptions under Art. 9 of the Hague Convention will not have a sufficiently detrimental 
effect on the application of the Convention, stating that the “…grounds on which 
recognition and enforcement may be refused are generally similar, with the list being 
somewhat longer under the Hague Convention”.108 After an overview of the different 
grounds for refusal of enforcement, their conclusion is: 
 
“These differences are not likely to be sufficient at the outset of a transaction to tip the 
balance in favor of either arbitration or litigation”.109 
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On the whole, it seems that Brand & Herrup take a rather more positive view on the 
potential of the Hague Convention than Born does. While pointing out potential problems 
with its enforcement regime, mainly related to the exclusions from the Conventions scope 
and the exceptions from its applicability, they reach a consensus that the differences 
between the Hague and New York conventions are “not likely to be significant in the 
choice between arbitration and litigation”;110 their similarities are greater than their 
differences.  
 
4.3 Cordero-Moss 
 
On the subject of enforcement Cordero-Moss states that in the areas covered by the Council 
Regulation 44/2001 and the Lugano Convention (EU and EFTA), “court decisions enjoy 
the same regime as arbitral awards”.111  As pertains to the Hague Convention, the author 
refers to it as “partly similar”112 to the aforementioned systems without going into a direct 
comparison.  
 
She also points out that national courts in most states have moved towards a clear pro-
arbitration stance.113 On this point, Cordero-Moss and Born are in agreement, although the 
former seems more optimistic that the Hague Convention may provide an effective 
enforcement regime for foreign judgments.  
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With regard to the exceptions in Art. V of the New York Convention she highlights that 
these are “exhaustive and must be interpreted restrictively.”114. 
 
4.4 Teitz 
 
Teitz accentuates that the exceptions from the scope of the Hague Convention are a 
consequence of the difficulties of achieving a satisfactory compromise to be agreed upon 
by states with often significantly different political agendas, and particularly in 
harmonizing the civil and common law legal traditions. 115  
 
With regards to the refusal of enforcement under the Hague Convention, and exclusions 
from its scope116, Teitz has a different viewpoint from Born, arguing that the exceptions are 
only allowed under “narrowly defined circumstances.”117  The possibility for states of 
adding specific matters to the list in Art. 2 pursuant to Art. 21 is described as “very 
limited”118 and the author follows this by opining that the “strictly reciprocal nature of any 
opt-outs may well have a disciplining effect”.119 
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The author criticizes certain aspects of the convention (including the fact that a non-chosen 
court may nevertheless render an enforceable judgment instead of dismissing the case, 
pursuant to Art. 6)120 but draws the conclusion that the Convention should make 
“…litigation a more viable alternative to arbitration because it ensures the enforcement of 
forum selection clauses just like the New York Convention guarantees the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses”.121 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion on the comparability of the enforcement regimes 
 
While the above commentators diverge somewhat on the potential impact of the exceptions 
in the Hague Convention vis-à-vis its efficiency as an enforcement mechanism, there is at 
least consensus that the Convention will (should it come into force in a considerable 
number of states) make litigation a more attractive option by imposing an enforcement 
system similar (if not equivalent or exactly analogous) to that available under the New 
York Convention.  
 
This is, in a sense, rather obvious. It is possible to argue that the enforcement mechanism 
under the Hague Convention will be prevented by its exceptions and exclusions from doing 
for foreign judgments what the New York Convention has done for arbitral awards. It is far 
more difficult to assert that the Hague Convention will not create a status quo whereby 
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litigation will be viewed as at least a legitimate alternative in cross-border business 
transactions, where arbitration has previously been viewed as the often only reliable 
method for dispute resolution. 
 
On one hand the Lugano Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001 provide a framework 
of enforcement which perhaps surpasses the Hague Convention in terms of material 
efficiency (having as pointed out above, fewer exceptions and exclusions from their 
functioning). However given their more regional application, their overall effect is 
insufficient to challenge the position of arbitration in any other territories than those which 
fall under their scope. In a globalized world, where Brazilians do business with Germans, 
Americans with Malaysians and Norwegians with Ghanaians, and where constantly 
evolving methods of travel, transportation and electrocommunication make cross-border 
commerce always more enticing, the need for a predictable, uniform and above all else 
world-wide enforcement regime is exquisitely obvious. Before the Hague Convention 
actually enters into force and there is established at least some case law regarding its 
provisions, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how enforcement of foreign judgments under 
the convention will play out in practice. Regardless it does seem reasonable to assume that 
the Hague Convention would place the parties in a position where the choice between 
litigation and arbitration will to a greater extent “…hinge on the real differences between 
the two dispute settlement options, and not merely on the fact that one is more easily 
enforced than the other.”122 The differences between arbitration and litigation and 
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arguments advocated in favor and disfavor of both options, will be detailed in the 
following. 
5   Arbitration and litigation, a comparison of strengths and weaknesses 
 
For parties engaging in cross-border business transactions, it is particularly important to 
regulate in their agreement a method for dispute resolution should a conflict arise. Once a 
conflict has already arisen, it can be difficult for the parties to agree on anything 
whatsoever, which obviously includes under what kind of system the dispute will 
ultimately be resolved. 
 
Having concluded above that the enforcement regimes for arbitration under the New York 
Convention and the similar regimes under the Hague Convention, Lugano Convention and 
Council Regulation 44/2001 are similar enough that the aspect of the enforcement of an 
award or judgment is not sufficient on its own to make parties favor one of the options over 
the other (this is based on the supposition that the Hague Convention comes into force), it 
will therefore be necessary to compare other aspects that might tilt the balance in the favor 
of either arbitration or litigation, including: efficiency, confidentiality, expertise, neutrality 
and procedural flexibility.  
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5.1 Confidentiality 
  
A key difference between arbitration and litigation, is that court proceedings are normally 
conducted publicly, while the arbitration process is not. Many states have their court 
proceedings open not only to the public, but also the media, as a consequence of which the 
proceeding as well as outcome of the case may be disseminated to a substantial number of 
people. In contrast, arbitration is conducted with only those involved directly, typically the 
parties themselves, the members (or member) of the arbitration tribunal and at times 
witnesses and experts. Arbitration awards are rarely published, while judgments often 
are.123 
 
Nonetheless, confidentiality is by no means a given in arbitration. There are legal systems 
where there is no obligation towards confidentiality on the legislative plan, such as Norway 
and Sweden.124 In these places the arbitration rules of the local arbitral institutions 
(assuming institutional arbitration is used by the parties) ensure confidentiality.125 
However, if the parties have not submitted their dispute to an institution, but simply chosen 
arbitration in a certain state, they run the risk of having no confidentiality if the state in 
question has an arbitrational rule whereby there is a presumption for non-confidentiality 
unless the parties expressly derogate from this rule. The courts of other states (Canada, 
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Australia) have also been known to reject a general implied duty of confidentiality in 
arbitration where the parties have not regulated this in their agreement.126 
 
Whether institutional (an specialized arbitration institution administers the process) or ad 
hoc arbitration (the parties administer the process themselves, selecting arbitrators, the 
procedure to be followed etc) is chosen by the parties, they are able to regulate the 
confidentiality of their dispute in a way which parties submitting to litigation would not: 
either by selecting an institution where such confidentiality is a part of the institutions 
rules127 or by including a confidentiality clause if they are using ad hoc arbitration and have 
selected an arbitral seat where confidentiality is not guaranteed. Yet another option is for 
the parties to select the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to regulate their agreement. The 
original UNCITRAL Arbitration rules did not include any regulation of confidentiality, but 
this was amended in a 2006 revision.128 The rules now provide that the “…hearing shall be 
held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise”129 and that the award cannot be made 
public without the consent of both parties.130 There is no similar provision safeguarding the 
confidentiality of the arbitral procedure itself.  
 
However, it should be pointed out that investment arbitration (as opposed to commercial 
arbitration) is subject to a different system with regards to confidentiality. The key 
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difference between the two forms of arbitration is that investment arbitration does not only 
involve the interests of the parties directly involved in the dispute, but a potentially much 
larger sphere of persons and entities. Cordero-Moss uses the example that the commercial 
interests of the investor, based on the results of negotiations in the host state, might be at 
odds with the interests of the local community, necessitating public proceedings. 131 
Furthermore there is an issue at the state level, since decisions regarding the meeting of 
certain standards (typically based on public international law regulating protection of 
investment) will be of interest to not only the host state, but also to other states that may 
base their future conduct on the results on the case.132 The consequence of these factors is a 
differing approach to confidentiality than is normally the case with arbitration. While the 
rules for investment arbitration of the ICSID133 have many similarities with those 
applicable to commercial transactions:  
 
 “The information available in respect of investment protection is systematic and 
transparent, and awards are diligently and systematically published, analyzed, commented 
and classified in the name of a harmonized development in this branch of law”.134 
 
A hindrance towards a more complete harmonization is the issue that not all investment 
disputes are carried out within the ICSID framework.135 However, the UNCITRAL 
                                                
%$%!,SJ[IJSC8SOO!L"H%HM!N#!$B$!
%$"!)]P[!
%$$!)TQIJTUQPSTU\!,ITQIJ!RSJ!*IQQ\I^ITQ!SR!)TZIOQ^ITQ!+PON`QIOb!UT!PTOQPQ`QPST!SR!QWI!
=SJ\[!9UTY!7JS`N!IOQU]\POWI[!PT!%;BB!
%$@!,SJ[IJSC8SOO!L"H%HM!N#!$B$!
%$A!,SJ[IJSC8SOO!L"H%HM!N#!$B@!
 60 
Working Group II recently discussed the possibility of amending the UNICITRAL 
Arbitration Rules to achieve a similar regulation to ICSID on transparency and publicity in 
investment disputes. Although there was general agreement that such an amendment would 
be positive, lack of consensus regarding how such transparency would actually be achieved 
in practice (along with time constraints) meant that no such regime was introduced.136 This 
notwithstanding, it should be pointed out that the Working Group was green lighted by the 
UNCITRAL Commission to work specifically on the issue of transparency in investment 
arbitration. The groups last meeting (its 54th session) was held in New York in February 
2011, and as of yet there is no concurrence on the issue.137  
 
Based on the above it is reasonable to claim that arbitration, as per now, offers an overall 
higher level of confidentiality than litigation. However, this might not be viewed as 
positive by the parties in all circumstances. They may in fact wish that the details of their 
dispute be made public. Born makes this point, stating: 
 
“Where a company has a standard form contract, used with numerous counter-parties, it 
may want interpretations of the contract to be publicly known, and binding through 
precedent, as widely as possible. Thus, financial institutions, intellectual property licensors, 
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and franchisors may see litigation as a way to generate public awareness or case law that 
has an impact beyond the parties to a litigation”.138 
 
In the same vein, litigation can be seen as preferable for companies wishing to “clear 
themselves” in situations where accusations have been leveled against them (for instance 
for business malpractice). Recourse to arbitration could be seen as a way of resolving 
uncomfortable accusations in secrecy.  This of course pre-supposes a certain confidence on 
the part of the company that they are not culpable.   
 
5.2 Procedural flexibility 
 
Generally, procedural rules in national courts are not flexible. Parties submitting to 
litigation may decide the law to govern their dispute, and also, as we’ve seen (pursuant to 
the Hague Convention) select an exclusive forum in which to adjudicate their dispute. By 
comparison, adopting arbitration will allow the parties not only the choice of law and 
forum, but also the composition of the arbitral tribunal and rules on the admittance of 
evidence. They may even go into great detail, for instance by specifying the needed 
qualifications of the arbitrators139 or the range of sums that may be awarded by the tribunal 
to the winner of the dispute (a so called “high-low” arbitration clause).140 
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There can be little doubt that, from the outset, arbitration provides more flexibility for 
parties than litigation does. That is not to say however, that such flexibility should always 
be considered a strength. Cordero-Moss emphasizes that such flexibility can be used to 
delay the proceedings or can endanger the accuracy of the decision due to 
oversimplification.141 
 
5.3   Neutrality 
 
Another factor traditionally advanced in favor of arbitration is the purported neutrality of 
arbitral tribunals. Born claims that many national courts are “…distressingly inappropriate 
choices for the resolving of international contract disputes”142, referencing lack of 
experience, competence and judicial integrity as reasons for this viewpoint. He further 
highlights that a benefit of arbitration is that the parties can select the nationality (among 
other qualifications) of the arbitrators, which may prevent prejudice or bias against any of 
the parties. Furthermore, if a three-person tribunal is used, the parties may choose to select 
arbitrators from different legal traditions, enhancing the parties confidence in the 
procedural fairness of the tribunal.143  
 
One of the benefits of the Hague Convention is that it, as mentioned above, gives the 
parties the power to designate a specific court for the solving of future disputes in an 
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exclusive choice of forum agreement.  With regards to the issue of neutrality, this entails 
that parties may choose a forum that they both agree is neutral. A good selection for the 
neutrality criteria (as well as the expertise criteria, covered below) might according to Born 
be the courts of England, Switzerland or New York, given the ability of these jurisdictions 
to “…resolve complex transnational disputes with a fairly high degree of reliability”.144 
 
Cordero-Moss too considers neutrality a potential strength for arbitration, but emphasizes 
that this rests on the condition that the tribunal has been properly chosen.145 This is by no 
means a given, neither with institutional arbitration nor ad hoc arbitration. Both 
experienced and inexperienced arbitration institutions can make unfortunate appointments, 
in the same way that national courts can make mistakes that may cost the parties dearly. 
The difference is that there is less possibility for the parties to appeal against such mistakes 
when they occur in the arbitration process, given the lack of appellate review available 
under such circumstances.  
 
Nevertheless, it is submitted by some commentators that while some national courts may 
be able to provide a similar procedural neutrality (to that offered by arbitration) in certain 
cases, hardly any may offer the “…resources and experience possessed by a tribunal of 
three experienced international arbitrators”.146  
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On the whole it would seem that the Hague Convention, with its exclusive choice of court 
provisions in Art. 1 and Art. 3, would be a significant boost for parties seeking to rely on 
litigation in this respect. In the same way that parties to an arbitration agreement can 
designate the country where the arbitration is to have its seat, parties litigating can 
designate the national forum for deciding their dispute and in doing so indirectly selecting 
the laws under which the process shall be carried out. Unlike arbitration they cannot 
directly choose the law to govern the proceedings (in other words, one that is different from 
the law of forum the parties have selected). That is not to say that this should be viewed as 
a significant weakness as it is highly questionable whether this should be done in any case. 
As Redfern & Hunter point out: 
 
 “It is not easy to understand why parties might wish to complicate the conduct of an 
arbitration in this way (unless, as is possible, they do not understand what they are 
doing)”147 
 
5.4  Expertise 
 
Another factor that parties should take into consideration is the expertise of the decision 
makers. As we saw above, parties submitting to litigation may not select the judges that 
will rule on their case, while parties submitting to arbitration have considerable control 
over the members of the arbitral tribunal. As such they may specify certain qualifications 
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needed for the arbitrators, for instance an in-depth knowledge of a particular branch of 
business, a degree within a specific field or fluency in a certain language. Cordero-Moss 
emphasizes that parties using litigation have no guarantee that the judges have the technical 
or commercial insight to fully understand the dispute.148  Furthermore the judges may have 
trouble applying the law the parties have chosen to govern their agreement, if the law is one 
that the judges are unfamiliar with.149 It seems safe to assume that the parties would have a 
better chance of achieving a knowledgeable review of the dispute by either selecting an 
arbitral institution well-known for its ability to appoint arbitrators with a high-level of 
expertise, by specifying qualifications (as exemplified above), or by appointing the 
arbitrators directly.  
 
Similar observations made under point 5.3, can also be applied here: the ability of parties to 
chose an exclusive forum for the settlement of their dispute under the Hague Convention 
should balance out the equation to some extent. Parties would be able to select a forum 
with a reputation for its ability to handle disputes requiring significant business-specific 
insight and with proficiency in applying the law that the parties have subjected their 
agreement to.   
 
However, there is another side to the party autonomy granted to the arbitrating parties. The 
most important one is the risk that a party appoints an arbitrator who is not impartial, but 
rather becomes an active advocate for the appointing party. This could lead to the opposing 
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party doing the same, and could end with  a situation characterized by procedural 
inefficiency, gridlock and ultimately a resulting award of highly dubious quality. Cordero-
Moss states that the “…possibility to choose the arbitrators is a reason to prefer arbitration 
only if the chosen arbitrators are impartial and act professionally”.150 
 
It is difficult to disagree with this, but on the whole it seems likely that parties taking a 
responsible approach to the selection of their arbitrators (either directly or indirectly 
through a renowned institution) would have a better chance of achieving a procedure and 
outcome that fully take into account all technical and commercial aspects of the dispute, 
than parties submitting to litigation (even under an exclusive forum agreement). It is 
unrealistic to expect judges to have the equivalent knowledge within specific branches of 
business of arbitrators selected precisely for their knowledge within that branch.  
 
5.5 Efficiency and costs 
 
Born is quick to make the point that arbitration has both been argued to be, by some, a 
cheaper and quicker method of dispute of resolution than litigation, and by others as a 
slower and more costly option.151 He then goes on to state: 
 
“In reality, both international arbitration and international litigation can involve significant 
expense and delay, and it is difficult to generalize about which mechanism is necessarily 
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quicker or cheaper in every case. Nonetheless, some general conclusions can be drawn”.152  
The authors main points following this statement can be condensed as follows153: 
 
1) International commercial arbitration involves certain costs that do not exist under 
litigation, including: payment to the arbitrators themselves, the arbitration 
institution (if one is used), logistical expenses for travel and lodging to the arbitral 
seat, and rent of hearing rooms. 
 
2) On the other hand, litigation will usually be clearly more expensive where there are 
parallel or multiple proceedings in national courts. However, with an exclusive 
forum selection clause under the Hague Convention that yields an enforceable 
judgment, this argument does not carry much weight in favor of arbitration. 
 
3) Expenses in arbitration will not usually match those that might occur under the 
appellate review process in litigation. Since there is usually no appellate review for 
arbitration awards, these might typically cost less and take shorter time. To this it 
can be interjected that there are also many ways in which an arbitral proceeding can 
be delayed. Furthermore, as pointed out above, the validity of an award can be 
brought before national courts on several grounds.154 While the grounds are fairly 
limited and applied narrowly, they may nonetheless potentially contribute towards 
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significantly elongating the process of enforcement for the award, by putting it 
through an appeals process taking considerable time.  
 
4) Although settling a dispute in national courts can take substantial time, the 
arbitration process is not necessarily speedy either. Disputes will often require 
between 18 to 36 months before a final award is reached, and may take even longer 
if the procedure is delayed as a consequence of  (for instance) procedural mishaps 
or a challenge of aspects of the award before national courts. This issue can be 
somewhat ameliorated by the parties in a number of ways: 
 
a) They can appoint only one arbitrator as opposed to three. This will obviously be 
more efficient, but special care must be taken when selecting the arbitrator 
given the power that will then be left in that persons hands.155 
 
b) The parties may insert a “fast-track” arbitration clause in their agreement, which 
essentially entails a simplified procedure to be followed by the tribunal. Such 
clauses might typically be used where the dispute is not overly complex. Its use 
does however raise other issues, particularly with regards to the procedural 
necessities (like the right to present one’s case properly156) 
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c) The parties can also set a timetable within which the award must be rendered, or 
even more specifically with detailed timeframes for each step of the procedure. 
While Born states that such methods can be effective, he is also quick to point 
out the strategy also has its risks: the parties may be imposing unrealistic 
conditions on the tribunal, and additionally, the validity of the award (as well as 
the arbitration agreement) may be challenged if the award is not rendered within 
the granted timeframe.157  
 
One the whole, the commentators make it clear that issues of efficiency and cost do not 
strongly favor choosing either arbitration or litigation. Born says that “international 
arbitration does not generically have either dramatic speed and cost advantages or 
significant disadvantages as compared to national court proceedings”, 158 although he does 
go on to qualify that statement by saying that generally arbitration will be faster due to lack 
of appellate review.   
 
Spigelman is also critical of the idea that arbitration is cheaper and faster than litigation, 
stating:  
 
“Although it is often said that international commercial arbitration is preferable  
because it is capable of delivering a quicker and cheaper dispute resolution  
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procedure, I am not convinced that that actually occurs in practice.  Indeed, users  
of international commercial arbitration are increasingly expressing the view that  
they prefer alternative mechanisms such as mediation, by reason of the costs of  
arbitration.”159 
 
 
 
It therefore seems accurate to postulate that the cost and speed of a dispute  
resolution process will vary greatly depending on the nature and complexity of the dispute, 
and that it is difficult to generalize whether arbitration or litigation will be preferable under 
these criteria. One might venture that litigation could be preferable if the parties are 
reasonably sure that a judgment in their dispute will not be appealed or if the parties simply 
do not have the resources to pay the substantial sums often required for arbitration 
(typically for medium or small sized businesses). On the flip side arbitration may be seen 
as preferable under these criteria for large multinational companies with plentiful 
resources, as they can afford the cost of arbitration, and have the insight in how to tailor the 
arbitration agreement to assure a relatively efficient process. 
 
5.6    Conclusions 
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First I think it should be pointed out that it is inaccurate to state that either litigation or 
arbitration is the overall “superior” method for dispute resolution. Both approaches have 
their strengths and weaknesses, and parties will have to evaluate a number of factors before 
making their choice. A particularly important factor in this regard is the weight that the 
parties place on the above factors: there is no reason to assume that they will all be equally 
important. Confidentiality may be key for companies whose focus is on not revealing its 
business tactics or maintaining its squeaky-clean image. Expertise may be viewed as the 
most important factor for companies involved in very complex and technical business 
transactions. Neutrality may be seen as the most critical factor if the companies have 
experienced biased outcomes before. 
 
Also, some companies may not place as much weight on certain of the above factors. 
Companies with enormous monetary assets might take the view that “money is no object”- 
the cost is no obstacle.  
 
While it is difficult to generalize, I believe the following conclusion can be drawn. For 
parties for whom expertise, confidentiality and neutrality are the deciding factors, 
arbitration may be a better choice. Even with the ability for parties to insert an exclusive 
choice of forum clause in their agreements, and thus select a jurisdiction known for their 
competence within these areas, it will be difficult to match the arbitral tribunals in these 
respects. While certain jurisdictions have a good deal of experience with (even quite 
complex) business transactions, it is not realistic to expect them to compete in terms of 
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expertise with arbitrators selected precisely for their depth of knowledge within the 
particular area that is the object of the dispute.  
 
Similar observations can be made for neutrality, although perhaps to a lesser extent: there 
are a good number of jurisdictions that provide an unbiased and fair review of the merits of 
a dispute. There is also the issue that parties may select arbitrators that become advocates 
for them, rather than neutral parties. Nevertheless, considering the many undeveloped 
jurisdictions around the world, it seems fair to assume that parties submitting to arbitration 
would have a somewhat better chance at getting an unbiased result. 
 
Confidentiality is a criterion where it is difficult for the national court system, given its 
normally open nature, to compete. While there are exceptions to confidentiality for 
arbitration, both under certain state laws and for particular areas of business- these are in 
the end exceptions. While there is no guarantee for confidentiality under arbitration, there 
is very little chance for any confidentiality whatsoever under litigation. 
 
It should however be noted that the costs of a dispute resolution process can be of deciding 
importance for a company. Paying the often (exorbitant) fees needed for an arbitration 
process can be quite unrealistic for small and even medium-sized companies and as we will 
se below, arbitration is under some pressure to adapt to the criticism of being overly 
expensive. 
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In other cases than the ones mentioned above, it does not seem as if either arbitration or 
litigation offers any major advantages or disadvantages.  This conclusion has a caveat, 
namely that it is based on the assumption that the Hague Convention will come into force. 
Without the Hague Convention, parties will not have the ability to select an exclusive 
forum (known for its positive qualities) in which to have their dispute adjudicated and have 
the subsequent judgment enforced effectively world-wide (which also assumes the 
accession by a number of states comparable to those party to the New York Convention). 
Until such a time where the Hague Convention comes into force, arbitration should 
therefore remain the favored method for dispute resolution in most international 
commercial disputes, barring only where the parties are within the confines of the Lugano 
Convention and Council Regulation 44/2001. In these cases the conclusion at the top of this 
paragraph will apply.  
 
6         The future of arbitration 
 
Earlier in this thesis, I have alluded to a growing criticism of arbitration. 
This part of the thesis is intended to look at some of these criticisms, and consider these in 
the light of the evolution of international litigation through the choice of court conventions 
I’ve covered in the course of the preceding pages (with particular emphasis on the Hague 
Convention). I will do this by evaluating several studies where practitioners (mainly 
counsel) voice their opinions on different aspects of arbitration. 
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If the general consensus among practitioners is sufficiently and increasingly negative to the 
use of arbitration, it might suggest that arbitration is in danger of losing its position as a 
preferred method for dispute resolution in cross-border commerce. Stipanowich references 
an ABA symposium spotlighting  “The Vanishing Trial”, which is characterized by a 
substantial drop off in number of cases (both at a federal and state level) resolved in 
American courts in the period 1962 to 2002.160 The author goes on to say that the declining 
use of litigation “…may be attributed at least in part to business and public concerns about 
the high costs and delays associated with full-blown litigation, its attendant risks and  
uncertainties, and its impact on business and personal relationships.”161 
 
As we shall see, it is possible to argue that arbitration may be headed down a similar path.  
The consequences could be a similar decline in the use of arbitration, in lieu of other 
methods for dispute resolution- perhaps including a resurgence for litigation. 
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6.1    Arbitration becoming the “new litigation”? 
 
However, the perhaps most prevalent criticism of arbitration is in fact that it is increasingly 
becoming more and more similar to the process of litigation.  The president of an 
organization of surety companies formulated this criticism in the following way:  
 
“…arbitration has turned into essentially litigation, with all the expense of litigation, and 
without the court”.162 
 
A similar frustration was expressed sardonically by Lord Mustill, when he stated that 
international arbitration had “…all the elephantine laboriousness of an action in court, 
without the saving grace of the exacerbated judge’s power to bang together the heads of 
recalcitrant parties”.163  
 
Stipanowich provides an explanation for why arbitration has seemingly moved in this 
direction: 
 
“In order to grapple more effectively with a wide range of business disputes, including 
many large, complex cases, arbitration procedures have tended to become longer and more 
detailed, and lawyers bring to bear the same tools of zealous advocacy they employ in 
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litigation.”164  
 
The author then goes on to reference several issues contributing to this, including: 
 
1) The expansion of discovery (that is to say, the process in which each party can obtain 
evidence from the opposing party, for instance by requesting documents).  
 
2)“Docketing” problems (as the author points out: “The problem of finding mutually 
acceptable dates is exacerbated by the use of a three-member tribunal, common in 
commercial arbitration.  Such realities may be readily exploited by parties hoping to benefit 
from delay”)165 
 
3) The judicial review of arbitral awards; Stipanowich references a 2004 study that might 
indicate that arbitral awards are coming under tougher scrutiny in the courts of key 
commercial states in the United States (New York, California, Connecticut) and may in 
these states be as “…vulnerable to reversal as court trial judgments”.166 He does however 
also point out that caution must be used in drawing conclusions from a study with such a 
small sample size. 167 
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With these criticisms in mind (as well as the criticisms covered in Part 5 of this thesis), I 
will now briefly look at a study that deals with the level of satisfaction that legal 
practitioners have with arbitration as a system. 
 
6.2     Queen Mary University study 
 
The most comprehensive and recent study on this subject is entitled:  “International 
Arbitration: Corporate attitudes and practices 2008”. The survey is sponsored by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers and was carried out by the Queen Mary University of London. 
According to the executive summary, the study was carried out over 6 months, and uses the 
data from 82 questionnaires and 47 interviews with corporate counsel (in major 
corporations that use arbitration).168 
 
In the executive summary, one can read the following: 
 
“International Arbitration has long asserted its superiority over transnational litigation – not 
least when it comes to producing an end result. Through the 1958 New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, it claims to offer 
prevailing parties a better chance of obtaining enforcement of awards in most countries 
around the world. But does International Arbitration actually deliver?”169 
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As I see it, the key findings of the study (as pertains to this thesis) are as follows: 
 
6.2.1     Use of international arbitration 
 
When queried on what method for the resolution of international disputes was used the 
most by the corporation, 44% of the respondents indicated they mostly used international 
arbitration, while 41% indicated they mostly used transnational litigation. In a similar 2006 
study, the percentage preferring litigation was lower.170 
 
6.2.2     Satisfaction with international arbitration 
 
86% of the respondents were satisfied with international arbitration (with 18% being very 
satisfied, and 68% being fairly satisfied). Only 5% were disappointed. According to the 
study, the disappointed respondents were displeased with the “…increased costs of 
arbitration and delays to proceedings.”171  However, most of the respondents “…spoke of 
the major benefits of arbitration, particularly the enforceability of arbitral awards, the 
flexibility of the procedure and the ability to select experienced arbitrators.”172 
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6.2.3 Recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
 
According to the study, the majority of the corporations that had sought the enforcement of 
awards had not encountered any major problems in doing so.  Of those surveyed, 19% had 
encountered such problems.173 In turn, 70% of these problems related to either the lack of 
assets of the award debtor, or being unable to identify or access the assets of the debtor.174 
In 17% of the cases the respondents gave the reason that the place of enforcement and 
recognition was hostile to foreign awards.175 Only 6% reported such difficulties due to the 
fact that the New York Convention was not applicable176 (in other words, the state in which 
enforcement was sought was not a signatory to the New York Convention). 
 
6.2.4        Factors influencing the place of enforcement 
 
Interestingly, the most significant factor for the respondents in deciding where to seek 
enforcement of an award, is the place where the award debtor has sufficient assets (with 
27% reporting this as the most important factor).177 
By contrast, 20% of the respondents would place most weight on the applicability of the 
New York Convention.178  This does not necessarily imply that the New York Convention 
is not a crucial part of international arbitration. One could argue that parties do not consider 
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the question its applicability a determinative factor since it is well-known that virtually all 
relevant commercial states are signatories179, therefore making other issues more relevant.  
 
 
6.2.5       Conclusion on corporate attitudes towards arbitration 
 
I believe the Queen Mary Study suggests that there is (as of now) no reason to proclaim the 
downfall of international arbitration as a means of dispute resolution in international 
business transactions. The data indicates a solid support for the use of international 
arbitration, and a general satisfaction with the results that it yields. At the same time, I 
think it is important to highlight several matters: 
 
1)  When comparing the 2008 Queen Mary Study to the similar study carried out in 
2006180 (again sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers), the data of the former shows 
an increase in preference for transnational litigation in comparison with the latter. 
While arbitration remains the preferred method (44% to 41% as referenced above), 
it is interesting to note that litigation appears to be closing the gap. Whether this is a 
trend that will continue in the future, is a matter on which one can for now only 
speculate.  
                                                
179 See the official list of non-signatory nations here: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
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2)  Despite the general satisfaction with international arbitration that the Queen Mary 
Study suggests, it is clear that there also is a not insignificant level of criticism 
being leveled at international arbitration as a system. In particular, the often 
considerable costs of arbitration are mentioned as a contentious issue.  As 
mentioned above, another criticism is that the process of arbitration is becoming too 
similar to a court trial.  
 
If arbitration is to remain the preferred and premier option for dispute resolution in 
international commercial disputes, it is crucial that it as a system adapts to the challenges 
posed by other such methods. Mediation is becoming increasingly more popular, and the 
Hague Convention may come into effect in a short while making transnational litigation far 
more attractive than previously. It is up to the arbitration institutions around the world to 
rise to this challenge, if international arbitration as a system is to remain competitive. If 
they do not do this, international arbitration may very well fade into obscurity. 
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